Finding Objectively Valid Orientation through Value Plurality

Abstract

The central thesis of this article is that the plurality of value beliefs in modern society, which reveals the relativity of culturally learned value beliefs, does not lead to moral relativism or a relativism of orientation. Relativism is understood here as a rejection of the view that normative disagreements can be resolved objectively, and is thus the opposite of moral objectivism. In the beginning, the obvious close relation between value and orientation is discussed. Subsequently, several reasons are given as to why plurality does not imply relativism. In doing so, four important distinctions are made: plurality is distinguished from pluralism, objectivism from monism, objectivity from generality and the idea of epistemic objectivity of normative claims from the idea of independence of values from subjective properties such as preferences. Moreover, it is shown that plurality can be used methodologically to determine which things are objectively valuable. The disorientation one can experience in the face of plurality of value beliefs can therefore be seen as a means for finding out what one should really orient oneself towards. I conclude the argument by pointing out that it is practically necessary for normative ethics to understand the mind and its faculties correctly. Normative truth requires a plausible and scientifically grounded view of the mind.